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We analyze the aid portfolio of various bilateral and multilateral donors, testing 
whether they have prioritised aid in line with the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). In doing so, we combine sectorally disaggregated aid data with indicators 
reflecting the situation of recipient countries regarding the MDGs. Our results show 
that donors differ not only in terms of their overall generosity and the general poverty 
orientation of aid, but also in the extent to which their sectoral aid allocation is 
conducive to achieving more specific MDGs such as all children completing a full 
course of primary schooling, reducing child and maternal mortality as well as 
reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS. Overall, while some MDGs, e.g., the fight against 
HIV/AIDS, have shaped the allocation of aid, the sector-specific results reveal that 
with respect to other MDGs, most notably primary education, there is a considerable 
gap between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation. These results invite the 
conclusion that the current focus on substantially increasing aid in order to turn the 
tide in trying to achieve the MDGs misses one important point: Unless the targeting of 
aid is improved, higher aid will not have the desired effects. Our results suggest that at 
least part of the blame for missing the MDGs falls on insufficient targeting of aid. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Various developing countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa, are highly likely to miss 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNDP 2005a: 9). This does not only 
apply to the first and most prominent target, which requires halving the incidence of 
absolute poverty (the proportion of people living on less than one dollar a day) by the 
year 2015. Even though more specific MDGs have received less attention in public 
debate, the prospects for achieving education and health-related targets are still worse 
(Berg and Qureshi 2005: 21). Easterly (2005) lists “a litany of failure” by referring to 
the report on the MDGs presented by the Secretary General of the United Nations to 
the UN World Summit in September 2005 (UN 2005). 
To turn the tide, recent reports published by the UN Millennium Project, directed by 
Jeffrey Sachs (UNDP 2005a), and the Commission for Africa, set up by Prime 
Minister Tony Blair (CFA 2005), have issued urgent calls to increase official 
development aid substantially and, thereby, close the gap between donor rhetoric and 
reality. Accordingly, donors are mainly compared with regard to their “generosity” in 
granting aid. Japan and the United States are widely blamed for falling grossly short of 
the UN target of 0.7 percent of gross national income to be devoted to aid, whereas the 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries exceeded this target in 2004 (OECD 2005).  
In addition to the quantity of aid, qualitative aspects of aid are increasingly recognized 
to be important for effectively meeting recipient needs. Donors are, for instance, 
requested to improve the effectiveness of aid by no longer tying aid, i.e., requiring the 
recipient to spend aid on goods and services supplied by the respective donor.
1 The 
effectiveness of aid may also be affected by the conditions that some donors and 
multilateral lenders attach to their grants and subsidized loans.
2 Critics of traditional 
aid practices argue that donors should provide aid in the form of grants rather than 
(subsidized) loans to prevent recipients ending up in a debt trap (Lerrick and Meltzer 
2002; Radelet 2005, Meltzer 2006).
3 Finally, the point has been made in several 
studies that aid effectiveness could be improved if aid was better targeted to poor 
recipient countries with reasonably good local conditions, e.g., in terms of basic 
                                                           
1   Roodman (2004: 9) discounts tied aid by 20 percent to account for its lower effectiveness. While 
many donors have untied aid, Roodman shows that aid by some donors, including the United 
States, continued to be tied to a considerable extent. 
2   For example, results in Dreher (2006) show that the overall impact of IMF programs on economic 
growth is negative, while compliance with the Fund’s conditions mitigates this negative impact. 
There is, however, no consensus view on the IMF’s impact on economic growth in borrower 
countries (see Conway 1994; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Atoyan and Conway 2006). 
3   For a critical evaluation of the proposed shift towards grants, see Nunnenkamp, Thiele and Wilfer 
(2005) as well as Cohen et al. (2005).   2
institutions and economic policies, that allow aid to be absorbed productively 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002).
4
Most studies that compare the allocation of aid across donors come to the conclusion 
that donor performance varies widely. According to Dollar and Levin (2004), some 
donors (International Development Association (IDA), Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands) take both the prevalence of poverty and the 
quality of institutions and economic policy into account, whereas France and the 
United States do not.
5 Dreher and Sturm (2005) as well as Canavire et al. (2005) show 
that donors vary in the extent to which they grant aid for political reasons and for 
reasons of economic self-interest. Regarding the United States, geopolitical and 
commercial interests seem to be the most important determinants of aid (Alesina and 
Dollar 2000).
6 Berthélemy (2004) finds that “all donors are not the same” with respect 
to various indicators of recipient need as well as donor interest. A drawback of all 
these studies is, however, that they are based on aggregate aid figures. None goes 
beyond excluding emergency support from “regular” aid in accounting for the 
heterogeneity of aid, even though Harms and Lutz (2005: 35) concluded from a survey 
on the economic growth effects of aid that “it is not surprising that a variable as 
aggregate as official development assistance does not have a robust effect on growth.”  
Only few of the studies addressing the actual behaviour of donors take up the issue of 
aid heterogeneity. A notable example is Roodman (2004), who provides a detailed 
account of donor performance by combining quantitative and qualitative measures of 
aid, including “penalties” for tying aid and so-called project proliferation as well as a 
discounting system favouring aid to poorer and better-governed countries. Yet, his 
ranking of donors is dominated by differences in the overall quantity of aid. More 
specifically, Neumayer (2005) assesses the allocation of food aid. His findings 
underscore the need for a disaggregated analysis of aid. The allocation of food aid 
differs strikingly from previous results on the allocation of overall aid; food aid 
                                                           
4   However, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) and Hudson and Mosley 
(2001) test the robustness of the interaction term between the Burnside-Dollar policy index and aid, 
reporting the interaction to be statistically insignificant in many cases. 
5   Amprou et al. (2005) show that the pattern of donor selectivity changes considerably once the 
vulnerability of recipient countries to exogenous shocks and their level of human capital are 
considered as additional selectivity criteria. 
6    Regarding the determinants of Japanese aid, commercial interests seem to be most important 
(Alesina and Dollar 2000; Schraeder et al. 1998). Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Stokke (1989) 
confirm that Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden allocate aid mainly in line 
with humanitarian concerns. Multilateral institutions seem to generally pay greater attention to 
recipient needs than bilateral donors do (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Alesina and Dollar 2000). 
Canavire et al. (2005) find no indication that donor countries were able to push through their 
individual trade and political interests at the multilateral level. However, various other studies 
suggest that multilateral institutions are not invulnerable to donor pressure (Weck-Hannemann and 
Schneider 1981; Frey and Schneider 1986; Dreher 2004; Fleck and Kilby 2005; Kilby 2006). 
Dreher and Jensen (2006) show that political proximity to major donor countries even influences 
the number of conditions under IMF programs.   3
appears to be better targeted at countries in need than other forms of aid. However, 
food aid accounted for just about 3 percent of total aid in the late 1990s. 
Some other studies compare the effects of different forms of aid. Gupta et al. (2003) 
distinguish between grants and loans and show that loans are generally associated with 
higher domestic resource mobilization, whereas grants have the opposite effect.
7 
However, the findings of Cordella and Ulku (2004) suggest that the disincentive 
effects of grants with regard to domestic resource mobilization are dominated by debt 
management problems when poor and badly governed countries receive aid 
predominantly in the form of grants. Mavrotas (2003) and Cordella and Dell’Ariccia 
(2003) distinguish program aid (or general budget support) from project aid. 
According to Mavrotas, project aid reduces public investment in the recipient country, 
while program aid complements public investment. Cordella and Dell’Aricca find 
budget support to be less (more) effective than project aid in a local environment of 
poor (good) macroeconomic policies.  
The sectoral composition of aid, on which we focus in this paper, has received only 
minor attention in previous efforts to account for aid heterogeneity. This is surprising 
once it is taken into consideration that the sectoral composition of aid should have an 
important say on whether or not donors help in achieving MDGs other than the general 
target of halving absolute poverty. To the best of our knowledge, Clemens et al. (2004) 
were the first in drawing on the sectorally disaggregated data on aid commitments 
provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Creditor 
Reporting System to reconsider the economic growth effects of aid. Based on the 
detailed purpose codes of aid commitments, these authors isolate the portion of aid 
which they consider likely to affect growth within the relatively short period of up to 
five years typically examined in cross-country studies on the aid-growth nexus. They 
exclude not only aid items such as emergency relief, on the grounds that emergency 
relief does not adhere to selectivity concerns underlying regular aid and that 
emergencies are likely to result in lower incomes even if aid provides a cushion, but 
also items such as aid to support democratic institutions, the environment or education, 
whose (possibly strong) impact on long-term growth cannot be captured in the short 
run. Clemens et al. find the remaining so-called short-impact aid to exert a strong and 
robust effect on economic growth in the recipient countries. They conclude that the 
heterogeneity in aid flows, rather than the heterogeneity of recipients, is the key reason 
why growth effects have been difficult to detect. 
This conclusion has been contested by Rajan and Subramanian (2005). When using the 
measure of short-impact aid suggested by Clemens et al. (2004), Rajan and 
Subramanian do not find any significant impact on growth once the endogeneity of aid 
is dealt with by constructing “instruments for aid that are more likely to be exogenous 
and satisfy the exclusion restrictions” (p. 8). Both studies have several limitations in 
                                                           
7   Odedokun (2003; 2004) corroborates the revenue-reducing effect of grants for lower-income 
countries but not for higher-income countries.   4
common, however: First, the effectiveness of aid is not compared across (bilateral and 
multilateral) donors. Second, the heterogeneity of aid is assessed only with regard to 
economic growth effects materializing in the short or longer run.
8 Third, the definition 
of short-impact aid misses more specific dimensions of aid heterogeneity. Clemens et 
al. subsume various aid categories under short-impact aid, including aid for directly 
productive purposes (in sectors such as agriculture and industry), investments in 
economic infrastructure, as well as budget and balance of payments support. The 
heterogeneity within this broad category, accounting for almost half of total aid, is 
ignored. 
In this paper, we follow Clemens et al. (2004) in making use of the sectorally 
disaggregated DAC data. In contrast to their analysis of growth effects, however, we 
take a broader view and differentiate aid by the various specific purposes it is meant to 
serve according to announcements made by donors. Donors stress the multi-
dimensional objective function underlying their aid allocation (Isenman and 
Ehrenpreis 2003).
9 In a similar vein, McGillivray (2003) as well as Amprou et al. 
(2005) call for a broader concept of aid selectivity and make a case for extending the 
selectivity model based on the income and policy situation of recipient countries 
proposed by Collier and Dollar (2002). While it is widely acknowledged that aid may 
reduce poverty through its impact on economic growth, “it must also be recognized 
that aid can reduce poverty through other channels” (McGillivray 2003: 29). Pro-poor 
public expenditures, e.g., in the fields of basic education and basic health, are often 
noted in this context.
10 The MDGs provide an obvious point of departure for taking 
account of a broader range of poverty-relevant objectives of aid.
11
Specifically, we compare the aid portfolio of various bilateral and multilateral donors 
and investigate whether they have prioritised aid in line with the MDGs. For example, 
the MDGs suggest that aid should be targeted at improving basic education and health 
conditions in recipient countries. Hence a necessary – though not sufficient – condition 
for achieving education and health-related targets would be that the share of aid in 
these sectors is high and increasing. In section II, we examine to what extent donors 
have met this condition. Section III evaluates whether donors have allocated sector-
specific aid according to specific needs of recipient countries. We combine 
                                                           
8   As noted by Clemens et al. (2004), extending the period of observation gives rise to more noise 
and, thus, renders it increasingly difficult to establish a causal relationship between aid and growth. 
Yet, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) insist that the appropriate horizon is longer than the typically 
considered period of up to five years. 
9   For instance, Svensson (2005) notes that the Swedish aid agency SIDA lists five objectives in 
addition to promoting economic growth in the recipient country: economic and social equality; 
economic and political independence; democratic development; environmental care; and gender 
equality. 
10   As another example, Abu-Ghadia and Klasen (2004) calculate substantial costs in terms of 
mortality and prevalence of underweight children under five for 45 countries likely to miss the 
target on gender equality. 
11  In the words of Isenman and Ehrenpreis (2003: 10), the MDGs “identify multidimensional poverty 
reduction as the ultimate objective of development efforts.“   5
disaggregated aid data with indicators reflecting the situation of recipient countries 
with regard to the MDGs. It turns out that donors differ not only in terms of their 
overall generosity and the general poverty orientation of aid, but also in the extent to 
which their sectoral aid allocation is conducive to achieving more specific MDGs such 
as all children completing a full course of primary schooling, eliminating gender 
disparity in education, reducing child and maternal mortality, reversing the spread of 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, as well as ensuring access to safe water and sanitation. 
Section IV summarizes the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
II. The Sectoral Distribution of Aid: Some Stylized Facts 
 
In examining the sectoral composition of aid, we first consider all donors taken 
together and then look at selected donors individually. These include the two main 
multilateral donors (EU and IDA), the five biggest bilateral donors (France, Germany, 
Japan, United States, and United Kingdom), and a group of countries (Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), which are not only generous donors but are also 
supposed to target aid carefully according to recipient needs.
12 For all aid categories 
we apply the grant equivalent, i.e., the product of the nominal amount of aid and the 
grant element; this variable best reflects the effective financial support of donors.
13 In 
addition, we rely on commitments, which in contrast to disbursements are available in 
the sectorally disaggregated form needed for the analysis in section III. While it is true 
that disbursements most accurately capture the resource transfers actually taking place, 
our results are unlikely to be biased by the choice of commitments as the two are 
highly correlated (Neumeyer 2003).  
As shown in Table 1, the sectoral composition of aid for all donors taken together has 
changed quite dramatically over the last two decades. As concerns the MDGs, the 
most notable result is that the share of aid devoted to the social sector rose from about 
20 percent in the period 1990-1992 to about 35 percent in the period 2002-2004, with 
higher spending on education, health and population programs, though not on water 
and sanitation.
14 The expansion of social sector aid has come at the expense of aid 
towards more traditional targets such as infrastructure and agriculture, but it also 
reflects a move from program assistance to project financing. The latter is somewhat at 
odds with donors’ claims to promote ownership of development strategies on the part 
of recipients, which would require general budget support rather than a proliferation of 
projects. Emergency relief and reconstruction is an aid category that has recently 
                                                           
12  Neumeyer (2003) calls these countries like-minded donors; Kilby (2006) employs these countries’ 
aid allocation as a humanitarian benchmark. 
13  The calculations were also run on the basis of nominal aid. The results for nominal aid hardly 
differed from those for grant equivalents, which is not surprising given the extremely high grant 
element of aid (Nunnenkamp, Thiele, and Wilfer 2005). Consequently, we do not report the results 
for nominal aid below. 
14  In order to capture recent donor behaviour, we include 2004 data even though they are provisional 
and regularly updated in OECD (2005). Our calculations are based on data available from this 
source in November 2005.    6
gained importance. The empirical finding that aid can be highly effective in post-
conflict situations (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) lends support to this new priority of 
donors. 
Table 1 — Distribution of Aid (grant equivalent) by All Donors Across Sectors, 1990–1992 
and 2002–2004 (percent of total aid)a 
Sectors  1990–1992  2002–2004 
Social infrastructure and services  20.7  34.5 
 Education,  total  5.9  8.2 
   Basic  education  0.8  2.8 
 Health,  total  3.1  4.8 
   Basic  health  1.3  3.0 
  Population programs and  1.7  3.8 
 reproductive  health     
  Water supply and sanitation  4.9  3.9 
    Basic water and sanitation  1.1  0.8 
Economic infrastructure  21.0  13.4 
Production sectors  17.7  7.3 
 Agriculture  12.1  4.4 
Multisector/cross-cutting  10.1  8.5 
  Gen. environmental protection  1.6  1.9 
  Women in development  0.1  0.1 
Commodity aid/general program assistance  20.0  9.6 
  Gen. budget support  12.5  7.0 
Action relating to debt  6.8  10.2 
Emergency assistance and reconstruction  2.7  10.4 
Support to NGOs  0.1  1.9 
Other  0.9  4.2 
aPeriod average of aid commitments. 
Source: OECD (2005). 
The overall pattern of aid masks substantial variations across donors (see Table 2). The 
share of aid going to the social sector ranges from 22 percent in Japan to 50 percent in 
Norway. Within this aid category, it is striking that France and Germany – and to a 
lesser extent Japan – put a strong focus on education but spend very little on primary 
education, even though the MDGs require donors to concentrate on basic education. 
Likewise, the composition of educational aid by Denmark, Japan and the EC does not 
suggest a strong orientation towards the respective MDG. Only in the Netherlands, 
Norway, and particulary in the United Kingdom, primary education carries a markedly  
 Table 2 — Distribution of Aid (grant equivalent) Across Sectors, Major Donors 2002–2004 (percent of total aid) 
Sectors   Denmark France  Germany Japan  Nether-
lands 




EC  IDA 
Social infrastructure & services  38.5  32.3  38.2  22.5  26.8  50.0  33.2  45.3  33.3  34.7  30.9 
 Education,  total  6.8  19.2  15.7  8.6  6.6  13.6  5.8  10.0  1.7  5.2  7.3 
  Basic  education  2.8  1.2  1.8  1.5  4.0  7.1  2.6  8.2  1.4  1.6  3.6 
 Health,  total  8.1  3.7  3.0  3.9  3.2  7.0  3.9  9.1  4.2  3.3  5.2 
  Basic  health  6.3  0.5  1.7  1.2  1.6  3.5  1.8  5.5  4.1  2.6  2.3 
 Population  programs  1.1  0.3  1.9  0.1  2.1  3.0  3.3  7.6  8.5  1.5  3.6 
  Water supply & sanitation  10.5  2.6  7.0  7.9  3.5  1.7  2.4  1.5  0.6  3.5  5.6 
    Basic water and sanitation  4.6  0.4  3.3  0.9  1.4  0.6  0.6  0.2  0.0  0.6  0.0 
Economic infrastructure  16.9  3.7  12.4  39.0  5.9  8.3  6.4  9.5  3.3  13.3  23.8 
Production sectors  10.0  4.0  4.5  8.6  4.8  6.3  3.5  5.2  6.4  8.7  8.9 
 Agriculture  6.3  3.2  3.2  7.2  3.9  5.1  3.0  3.2  1.9  3.1  7.0 
Multisector  7.2  6.3  11.3  3.9  6.1  9.2  11.9  5.3  12.8  9.5  3.7 
  General environment protection  5.0  2.7  2.4  2.8  2.9  2.5  2.5  1.1  1.5  1.7  1.0 
  Women in development  0.8  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.4  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Commodity aid/general program 
assistance  5.0  4.4  1.3  4.0  4.2  3.3  4.4  16.1  13.7  14.5  23.3 
  General budget support  5.0  3.3  0.5  3.3  4.1  3.2  4.4  14.7  7.2  9.9  22.8 
Action relating to debt  2.2  39.7  22.3  15.6  5.8  1.4  3.8  6.2  8.7  0.7  2.6 
Emergency assistance and 
reconstruction  4.8  8.6  3.8  3.4  9.1  20.3  19.2  11.7  17.1  14.3  7.1 
Support to NGOs  6.1  0.4  0.3  1.4  27.1  0.0  9.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 
Source: OECD (2005). higher weight. The leading position of the UK carries over to the concentration of aid 
on basic health services and population programs (mainly spending on HIV/AIDS), 
where it is followed by the United States, Denmark and Norway. As in education, the 
health-related aid committed by France and Japan does not appear to finance basic 
services from which poor population segments might benefit most. Denmark and 
Germany are the only donors that provide a non-negligible share of total aid for basic 
water and sanitation.  
Among the other aid categories that are mainly related to social rather than economic 
objectives, environmental protection and the promotion of gender equality, which both 
explicitly correspond to MDGs (see Annex), have received little attention by most 
donors. The new emphasis laid on emergency relief and reconstruction is not equally 
shared among donors, with Norway, Sweden and the United States being 
disproportionately engaged.
15 The smaller donors except Norway channel a 
considerable part of their aid budget through NGOs. Similar to social sector aid, these 
funds are unlikely to spur economic growth in the short to medium term as various 
NGOs focus on providing social services rather than financing projects in economic 
infrastructure or production sectors. 
As concerns the aid categories with a stronger growth orientation, some donors remain 
engaged to a considerable extent in areas that overall have lost in importance. Most 
notably, Japan uses almost 50 percent of its aid budget to finance economic 
infrastructure and to support production sectors, but the shares also still exceed 20 
percent in Denmark, the EU and IDA. Program assistance plays a significant role for 
the two multilaterals, the United Kingdom and the United States. Finally, the 
considerable weight of debt-related action in the period 2002-2004 is largely confined 
to France, Germany, and Japan.  
To derive an overall picture from these wide variations, Table 3 provides a rough 
indication of how large a part of each donor’s commitments can be classified as short-
impact aid along the lines of Clemens et al. (2004). For most donors, the share of 
short-impact aid is markedly below 50 percent, with the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden being most strongly focused on aid that cannot reasonably be expected to spur 
growth in the short run. Japan and IDA stand out as donors where the bulk of aid 
might have a short to medium run impact on recipient countries’ growth. In the case of 
IDA, this is partly due to its core business of extending adjustment loans, but it also 
reflects its second major focus on financing economic infrastructure.  
In summary, most donors’ sectoral aid composition appears to be in line with a multi-
dimensional objective function rather than one that narrowly focuses on economic 
growth. In the subsequent section, we will examine in more detail whether donors 
                                                           
15  For Sweden and the United States, the multivariate regression analysis conducted by Canavire et al. 
(2005) shows that post-conflict resolution has recently become a significant determinant of aid 
allocation across recipient countries.    9
have succeeded in reaching their multiple objectives by carefully targeting aid to those 
recipients most in need. In doing so, we will put a particular emphasis on the MDGs. 
Table 3 — Short-impact Aid by Major Donors, 2002–2004  
(percent of total aid) 
Country  Short-impact aida 









United Kingdom  37.0 





aShort-impact aid is assumed to comprise aid for economic infrastructure 
and for production sectors as well as commodity aid and action relating to 
debt. Given this rather crude classification, our figures are not directly 
comparable with those calculated by Clemens et al. (2004), who also 
differentiate within aid categories using the five-digit purpose codes of the  
DAC Creditor Reporting System. 
Source: Calculations based on Tables 1 and 2. 
 
III. Relating Aid Distributions to Aid Objectives  
 
1.  Approach and data 
 
In order to assess whether aid committed in 2002-2004 was conducive to achieving the 
MDGs, we proceed as follows. First, we select various indicators reflecting the 
situation of recipient countries in the year 2000 (or the closest year if no data are 
available for 2000) with regard to the MDGs (“indicators of need”).
16 All indicators 
used are defined in a way that higher values reflect greater need for aid. The choice of 
indicators is very much in line with the list of indicators suggested by the World Bank 
to evaluate progress made towards the MDGs.
17 In addition, we consider some more 
                                                           
16  For the complete list of indicators, definitions and data sources, see the Annex. 
17    See, for example, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId= 
LNAV01HOME1; or: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Resources/Document/ 
DC2003-0003-Add.1all.pdf.   10
traditional aid targets such as the development of infrastructure facilities and 
agricultural development as well as indicators reflecting the need of recipients for aid 
in these respects. As shown in Table 2 above, aid in infrastructure and production 
sectors such as agriculture continued to be important for some donors. Moreover, 
recent research has indicated that aid granted for improved infrastructure, notably with 
regard to transportation systems and energy supply, as well as for overcoming 
agricultural supply bottlenecks may help alleviate poverty and, thus, contribute to 
achieving the MDGs (Agence Française de Développement et al. 2005). 
Second, we select various aid categories from the sectorally disaggregated DAC 
database on aid commitments (Creditor Reporting System) that are supposed to be 
most relevant for aid to be effective in contributing to the MDGs. The selection of aid 
categories ranges from very specific categories such as infectious disease control (so-
called 5-digit CRS purpose codes) to more broadly defined categories such as basic 
health and health (so-called DAC sector codes). In addition, we consider total aid 
commitments to assess whether the pursuit of specific targets is strong enough to show 
up in overall aid allocations. The matching of aid targets, indicators of need and aid 
categories is specified in the Annex. 
We apply correlation analysis to assess whether donors have allocated total as well as 
sector-specific aid in accordance to indicators of need for an overall sample of 140 
recipient countries.
18 This approach has obvious limitations. Correlations may tell little 
on causation. More precisely, the correlation between, say, the primary school 
enrolment ratio in recipient countries and aid for basic education may understate the 
extent to which donors took low enrolment ratios into account when deciding on the 
allocation of educational aid as educational aid may help raise primary enrolment. 
However, reverse causation of this sort should not pose a major problem for our 
analysis due to the considerable time lags involved. As shown by Clemens et al. 
(2004), less than half of total aid can reasonably be expected to have short-term effects 
on the economic performance of recipient countries (see also section II above). The aid 
categories that are of primary interest with respect to the MDGs, notably aid subsumed 
under social infrastructure (education, health, population programs, water and 
sanitation, etc.), do not belong to short-impact aid. Furthermore, at least some of the 
indicators used here are clearly exogenous.
19 For other indicators, the risk of reverse 
causation is minimized by using data for 2000, whereas aid data refer to 2002-2004. 
Another limitation is that we do not control for aid determinants other than indicators 
of need. It is well established in the literature (i) that donors also pursue their own 
economic and political interests when deciding on aid allocation, and (ii) that recipient 
countries receive less aid than indicators of need would suggest because they are badly 
                                                           
18  As detailed when presenting results, the number of observations is sometimes considerably smaller 
due to lack of data for specific indicators of need. 
19  For example, “malaria ecology” represents an ecologically based indicator that is predictive of the 
extent of malaria transmission and combines information on temperature, mosquito abundance and 
mosquito vector type.   11
governed (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Canavire et al. 2005; 
Dollar and Levin 2004). The self-interest of donors may well have the effect that many 
of the correlations reported below remain insignificant. But this would not invalidate 
the conclusion to be drawn from insignificant correlations, namely that donors 
contributed less to achieving the MDGs than public statements seem to suggest. As 
concerns the governance of recipient countries, we decided against applying controls 
such as the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) or 
institutional indices provided by Kaufmann et al. (2003). Publicly available 
information on the CPIA is rudimentary and the use of it would reduce the number of 
observations considerably. The Kaufmann data, applied in Canavire et al. (2005), do 
not appear to have shaped the allocation of aid so far. Moreover, the use of these data 
would raise problems of endogeneity and reverse causation in itself (Gundlach and 
Hartmann 2005). 
Rather than controlling for governance, we ran additional calculations in which the 
sector-specific aid variables were defined as a share in total aid (instead of aid in per-
capita terms). The aid-share variables were supposed to prevent a downward bias in 
the correlations with indicators of need if donors granted a smaller amount of aid to 
badly governed recipients; such donor behaviour should leave the share of sector-
specific aid unaffected. However, it turned out that the definition of the aid variable 
had little effect on most of the correlations, and, in the remaining cases, very few 
correlations based on aid shares were stronger than the corresponding correlations 
based on per-capita aid.
20  
Finally, even if the allocation of sector-specific aid were in line with the MDGs, this 
would not necessarily imply higher resources devoted to specific targets. The 
fungibility of aid may undermine donor attempts to channel more funds to the targets. 
However, aid for, say, basic education is unlikely to be fully fungible (Feyzioglu et al. 
1998).
21 This is particularly true in countries heavily dependent on aid, where the large 
contribution of aid to public budgets limits the discretion of local governments to shift 
resources. In any case, donors are hardly to blame if the correlation with indicators of 
need turns out to be weaker for total (foreign and local) financing than for aid 
financing alone. 
We calculate (non-parametric) Spearman rank correlations, rather than (parametric) 
Pearson correlations. This is for two reasons. First, various indicators are defined such 
that their variance is restricted, whereas the variance of the aid variables is principally 
unrestricted. Second, non-parametric correlations minimize the impact of outliers. 
Elsewhere it has been shown that some small and relatively advanced developing 
countries received outstandingly high per-capita aid (Nunnenkamp et al. 2004: 21). 
Such outliers tend to have a critical impact on whether or not aid turns out to be well 
                                                           
20 These results are not reported here but are available on request. 
21  Clemens et al. (2004) note that their results on the aid-growth nexus support the view that aid is not 
fully fungible.   12
targeted.
22 In order not to bias results against donors and their claim that aid is well 
targeted we present only Spearman rank correlations in the remainder of this section. 
 
2. Results for aid by all donors 
 
Given that all indicators of need take higher values for recipients with greater need for 
aid, the correlations with aid should be positive if donors contributed effectively to 
achieving the MDGs by allocating aid according to the relevant indicators. 
Considering all donors together, this is indeed the case for various sector-specific aid 
categories (Table 4). Typically, the correlations between indicators of need and per-
capita aid become stronger with increasing specificity of the aid variable. Apart from 
environmental sustainability (see below on this target of aid), the few exceptions to 
this pattern concern more traditional targets of aid not directly related to MDGs. 
The typical pattern of specific aid categories being more strongly correlated with 
indicators of need is further supported by additional calculations run for five-digit CRS 
purpose codes of aid that are not listed in the table. For example, the correlation with 
the prevalence of HIV further increases (to 0.63) if aid specifically devoted to the 
control of sexually transmitted diseases is considered instead of aid related to health or 
population programs. The same applies if the correlations with the incidence of 
tuberculosis and malaria ecology are run on the basis of aid specifically devoted to 
infectious disease control, rather than basic health. This pattern is hardly surprising. 
Aid in more broadly defined categories and sectors, and even more so total aid, may be 
influenced by multiple objectives. Actually, donors have repeatedly criticized previous 
analyses of the allocation of total aid, in which the poverty orientation of aid was 
simply measured by the per-capita income of recipients as an all-embracing indicator 
of need. The sector-specific perspective taken in this paper is exactly meant to address 
this issue. 
However, the weak correlation of more broadly defined aid categories with indicators 
of need may also be due to some quantitatively important donors having contributed 
little to achieving the MDGs by appropriately targeting aid. This question will be taken 
up further below. At the same time, aid devoted to specific purposes may have failed 
to make much of a difference with regard to some MDG-related targets of aid. The 
aforementioned similarities across MDG-related targets notwithstanding, targets of aid 
differ considerably in the extent to which they have influenced the aid allocation of all 
donors taken together. The evidence for particular targets differs in several respects: (i) 
whether indicators of need are strongly correlated with specific aid categories such as 
basic health and basic education; (ii) whether or not the positive correlation persists at  
 
                                                           
22  For example, the correlations of health-related aid with the incidence of tuberculosis as well as 
malaria ecology turn completely insignificant when Pearson instead of Spearman rank correlations 
are run.   13
Table 4 — Correlation Results for Total Aid by All Donors
a  
Targets / indicators of need
b Aid  categories
c 




•  undernourishment (105)  0.32** 0.52** 0.61** 
•  malnutrion of children (93)  0.05 0.23*  0.28** 
Target 3: Primary schooling  Total aid  Education  Basic education 
•  net prim. enrolment (93)  0.16 0.10 0.36** 
•  primary completion rate (98)  0.13 0.13 0.38** 
•  av. years of schooling (76)  0.39** 0.37** 0.62** 
Target 4: Gender disparity in education  Total aid  Education  Basic education 
•  ratio boys / girls in education (121)  0.00 0.01 0.28** 
•  literacy ratio, males / females (94)  0.12 0.25*  0.34** 
Target 5: Under-5 mortality  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
•  under-5 mort. rate (137)  0.09 0.28**  0.48** 
•  immunization, measles (137)  0.05 0.23**  0.38** 
Target 6: Maternal mortality  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
•  maternal mort. ratio (120)  0.24** 0.39** 0.48** 
•  births attended (114)  –0.09 0.14 0.32** 
Target 7: HIV/AIDS  Total aid  Health  Population 
programs 
•  prevalence of HIV (98)  0.26* 0.29**  0.58** 
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases  Total aid  Health  Basic health 
•  incidence tuberculosis (138)  0.00 0.23**  0.41** 
•  malaria ecology (120)  0.23* 0.30**  0.31** 




•  CO2 emissions (128)  –0.31** –0.11  –0.37** 
•  forest area (133)  –0.16 –0.27**  0.05 
•  nat. protected areas (130)  –0.01 –0.28**  0.01 
•  GDP per unit of energy use (79)  –0.00 –0.24*  –0.14 
Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/slum  




•  access to improved water (129)  0.08 0.06 0.40** 
•  access to improved sanitation (127)  0.06 –0.06  0.26** 




•  rail lines (92)  0.12 –0.06  0.16 
•  roads, paved (122)  0.19* 0.17  0.24** 
•  motor vehicles (119)  0.21* 0.25**  0.47** 




•  electric power consumption (79)  0.39** 0.29** 0.26* 
•  energy use p.c. (84)  0.44** 0.33** 0.30** 
Target : Agriculture  Total aid  Production sectors  Agriculture 
•  fertilizer consumption (119)  0.29** 0.22*  0.42** 
•  irrigated land (118)  0.31** 0.12  0.16 
a Spearman rank correlation; **, * significant at 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.— 
b Number of 
observations in parentheses. For definition and sources, see Annex. — 
c Period average of grant equivalent of 
aid in 2002–2004, per capita of the recipient countries' population. 
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex.   14
the next level of aid aggregation such as health and education; and (iii) whether the 
indicator was considered important enough by donors to have shaped the allocation of 
total aid. 
By these criteria, the fight against hunger and HIV/AIDS appears to have received 
relatively high attention by donors. The prevalence of undernourishment and HIV are 
not only strongly correlated with specific aid categories, but have also influenced the 
allocation of total aid.
23 The finding of food aid being well targeted to needy recipients 
is in line with Neumayer (2005), according to whom self-interest on the part of donors 
has not played a role in this aid category. The prevalence of HIV persists to have an 
effect at the level of total aid even though HIV is relatively weakly correlated with the 
per-capita income of recipients (0.40). More generally, health-related aid was fairly 
well targeted at needy recipients, e.g., compared to MDG-related targets in the field of 
education. Relatively strong correlations concerning health-related Targets 5, 6, 7 and 
8 found at the level of aid in basic health remain significant at the level of aid in 
health, and for some indicators even at the level of total aid. Yet Table 4 points to 
notable differences between specific health-related targets and corresponding 
indicators of need. Compared to HIV/AIDS and malaria, donors appear to have paid 
less attention to the eradication of tuberculosis. The prevalence of tuberculosis did not 
affect the allocation of total aid, even though its correlation with per-capita income as 
an encompassing measure of need is stronger than that of HIV prevalence and malaria 
ecology. This is probably because tuberculosis figured less prominently in the public 
debate on reasonable targets of aid. 
In contrast to health-related aid, most of the correlations concerning educational 
Targets 3 and 4 are relatively low when run for aid in basic education, and turn 
insignificant when run for aid in education.
24 The latter finding is consistent with 
Table 1 in section II, where it was shown that donors devoted only about one third of 
education-related aid to basic education. The persistent inclination of donors to finance 
higher levels of education is likely to have undermined efforts to ensure that all 
children complete a full course of primary education and that gender disparity in 
education is eradicated. 
                                                           
23    The evidence presented in Table 4 is weaker for malnutrition of children than for 
undernourishment. But malnutrition of children is strongly correlated with aid devoted to basic 
nutrition (not shown). 
24  The major exception is the strong correlation with average years of schooling at all levels of aid. 
However, this indicator is clearly inferior to the other two indicators supposed to reflect the 
situation of recipient countries with regard to primary schooling. Target 3 requires donors to focus 
on primary education, while average years of schooling (which we considered in accordance to 
World Bank suggestions mentioned above) include more advanced levels of education. Moreover, 
the number of observations is considerably lower for average years of schooling. As concerns 
Target 4, we ran additional calculations for the aid category “women in development”. The 
correlations for this category remained insignificant. Even though aid related to “women in 
development” appears principally well suited to address gender disparity in education, this aid 
category remained marginal for all donors (Tables 1 and 2).   15
The evidence for Targets 10 and 11 is similar to that for education-related targets. The 
access of poor people to safe water and sanitation received little attention, even though 
aid specifically devoted to the five-digit CRS code “basic drinking water and basic 
sanitation” is positively correlated with indicators of need. Given that this aid category 
accounted for only 20 percent of aid committed to overall water supply and sanitation 
in 2002-2004 (Table 1), it is hardly surprising that the positive correlation breaks down 
at the next level of aid aggregation. Moreover, additional correlations performed for 
another five-digit CRS code of relevance to slum dwellers, namely “low-cost housing” 
(not shown), turned out to be completely insignificant. 
As in the case of other MDG-related targets, we followed World Bank suggestions in 
selecting indicators with regard to Target 9. However, the results for environmental 
sustainability reported in Table 4 are in serious conflict with the underlying 
assumption that donors may have considered these indicators to reflect the need for aid 
in this field.
25 If anything, the opposite was true. In the case of CO2 emissions, this is 
because per-capita emissions increase in line with rising per-capita income of recipient 
countries.
26 Whatever the environmental concerns donors might have wished to 
address by granting aid, they were dominated by the general poverty orientation of aid 
when it comes to the correlation between aid and CO2 emissions. In the case of 
indicators such as forest areas and nationally protected areas, the negative correlation 
with aid committed to environmental protection suggests that the focus of donors was 
on helping protect existing habitats, rather than financing the creation of new ones 
where forests and nationally protected areas accounted for a small percentage of total 
land area. 
In addition to MDG-related targets, the allocation of aid is assessed with regard to 
more traditional targets related to the financing of infrastructure and agriculture.
27 The 
correlation results provide further indications that more traditional targets continued to 
be important. Almost all indicators reflecting the need to develop transportation 
systems and the energy sector as well as to overcome supply bottlenecks in agriculture 
have significantly shaped the allocation of total aid. This is in striking contrast to some 
MDG-related targets, which dominated the debate on aid allocation in recent years. 
 
3. Donor-specific results 
 
Correlation results for aid granted by individual donors reveal that the targeting of aid 
differed considerably across the eleven (bilateral and multilateral) donors under 
                                                           
25  Additional calculations performed for aid in five-digit CRS codes “water resources protection” and 
“waste management/disposal” are not reported as they did not offer further insights. 
26  The correlation between these two variables is as high as 0.81. 
27   As concerns infrastructure, calculations with respect to communication systems and financial 
market development are not reported in Table 4. Both sectors accounted for a minor share in aid 
subsumed under “economic infrastructure” by all donors in 2002-2004 (4 and 9 percent, 
respectively). Most of the correlation results were relatively weak.   16
consideration. For a start, we correlated indicators of need with total aid per capita of 
the recipient countries’ population received from individual donors. Correlations are 
run (i) for all available observations, including those with aid=0 and (ii) for 
observations with aid>0. We thereby account for the two-step procedure of aid giving 
by individual donors, following what has become common practice in recent aid 
allocation studies (e.g., Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Canavire et al. 2005; Neumeyer 
2003).
28 The two-step approach is only applied at the level of individual donors, as 
there are few zero observations once all donors are taken together. This results in two 
sets of 22 correlations for each donor based on indicators for eight MDG-related 
targets plus three more traditional targets (agriculture, energy development, and 
transport infrastructure).
29 Figure 1 compares the percentage of significantly positive 
correlations across donors.
30
It is shown that the allocation of total aid by some major donors was hardly shaped by 
the pursuit of specific targets and related indicators of need. Japan represents an 
extreme case. For the second largest donor in terms of absolute aid disbursements in 
2002–2003 there are just two significantly positive correlations with the indicators on 
energy development.
31 Moreover, it is only for Japan that two correlations turn out to 
be significantly negative (immunization against measles and births attended by skilled 
health staff). The United States and the European Commission (EC), i.e., the numbers 
one and three among donors with regard to aid disbursements, are just slightly ahead 
of Japan in terms of allocating their total aid according to specific targets. The meagre 
performance shown for Japan and the EC is very much in line with what previous 
studies found when looking at the general poverty orientation of aid (e.g. Dollar and 
Levin 2004), while the picture for the United States is still inconclusive. 
Sweden, Denmark, Germany and France constitute the middle range in Figure 1, 
which is somewhat surprising in the case of France (see below for possible 
explanations), as this country has consistently been found to be one of the least 
poverty-oriented donors in previous studies (e.g., Canavire et al. 2005; Dollar and 
Levin 2004; Neumeyer 2003). Yet these donors differ in one important respect. 
                                                           
28For our second-step estimate to be unbiased, the two steps of the procedure must be independent of 
each other. Neumeyer (2003) explicitly tests whether this assumption holds; he finds that in almost 
all cases the hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected. By contrast, Berthélemy and Tichit 
(2004) conclude that their estimates based on strictly positive observations suffer from a sample 
selection bias.  
29  Target 9 “Environmental sustainability” is no longer considered for the reasons given above. For 
HIV we have only one indicator (prevalence of HIV). Average years of schooling are no longer 
included as an indicator of Target 3 “Primary schooling” (see above for reasons). For transport 
infrastructure we consider three indicators of need. The complete list of indicators is given in the 
note in Figure 1. 
30  Note that significantly negative correlations of Japanese aid with “immunization against measles” 
and “births attended by skilled health staff” are subtracted from the number of significantly positive 
correlations with respect to child mortality and maternal mortality, respectively. 
31 The lack of targeting found for Japan at least partly reflects the country’s strong focus on 
neighbouring Asian recipients with comparably favourable indicators of need.   17
Similar to the EC, Japan and the United States, France and Germany grant aid to 
essentially all 140 recipient countries in our sample. Hence, it does not make much of 
a difference whether the correlations for these donors are run with or without zero 
observations. By contrast, the smaller donors Denmark and Sweden are selective in 
deciding whether or not a recipient receives aid, but considerably less so in deciding 
on how much aid a recipient gets after having passed the first step.
32  
Figure 1 — Significance of Correlationsa between Total Aidb and Indicators of 
Needc: Donors Compared 












% of significantly positive coefficients
 
aSignificant Spearman rank correlation coefficients at 5 percent or better (positive coefficients 
minus negative coefficients) in percent of all correlation coefficients for the specific donor.—
bAid per capita of the recipient country's population. Black/grey columns: aid ≥ 0 / aid >0.—
cIndicators used for hunger: prevalence of undernourishment, malnutrition of children; 
primary schooling: net primary school enrolment, primary completion rate; gender disparity 
in education: ratio of girls to boys in primary & secondary education, literacy ratio males to 
females; child mortality: under-5 mortality, immunization measles; maternal mortality: 
maternal mortality ratio, births attended by skilled health staff; HIV: prevalence of HIV; 
malaria and other diseases: incidence of tuberculosis; malaria ecology; access to safe water 
and sanitation: access to improved water, access to improved sanitation; transportation 
systems: rail lines, paved roads, motor vehicles; energy sector development: electrical power 
consumption, energy use; agricultural development: fertilizer consumption, irrigated land. 
 
The treatment of zero observations is most important for aid extended by IDA. This is 
not surprising as IDA’s mandate is restricted to 81 sample countries with low per-
capita income.
33 Yet the low percentage of significantly positive correlations for IDA 
                                                           
32  Aid allocation in Denmark, but not in Sweden, seems to have followed the same pattern during the 
1990s (Neumeyer 2003). 
33  The income ceiling for IDA eligibility currently lies at US$ 965 per year.   18
aid>0 qualifies the finding of Dollar and Levin (2004), who regard IDA aid to be 
particularly well targeted. Similar to IDA, the United Kingdom belongs to the top-3 
performers in the first stage of the aid allocation process, whereas the percentage of 
significantly positive correlations for the United Kingdom aid>0 is fairly low. This 
compares unfavourably with the Netherlands. Even though the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom grant aid to a similarly large number of recipients (113 and 107, 
respectively, out of our 140 sample countries), total aid by the former donor is clearly 
more directed at specific targets in the second stage of the allocation process. 
Apart from the treatment of zero observations, it is for another reason that the 
correlations run on the basis of total aid of individual donors may provide a misleading 
impression on whether or not donors have allocated aid according to MDG-related and 
more traditional targets. Various indicators that we suppose to capture the need of 
recipients with regard to these targets are strongly correlated with each other, and with 
the average per-capita income of recipient countries.
34 Hence, the correlations reported 
for total aid may reflect the general poverty orientation of aid, rather than the pursuit 
of specific targets of aid.  
Therefore, we evaluate the allocation of donor-specific aid at the sectoral level in the 
following. In particular, we assess whether individual donors targeted aid in the sense 
that: 
•  developmental food aid as well as emergency food aid were granted predominantly 
to recipient countries whose population suffered from malnutrition and hunger; 
•  the health situation of recipient countries has shaped the allocation of aid subsumed 
under “basic health” and “population programs”; 
•  aid in “basic education” has been channelled to where primary education deficits 
and gender disparities in education were most pronounced; 
•  aid for improved water supply and sanitation has favoured the most needy; 
•  deficiencies in transport and energy infrastructure had an important say on aid 
allocation in these sectors; and 
•  aid in agriculture addressed critical supply bottlenecks in recipient countries. 
In all these respects, the following procedure is applied to account for the two stages of 
the aid allocation process of donors. In the first step, we assess whether indicators of 
need have shaped the decision of donors to provide or not to provide aid to a particular 
country. If so, indicator values for the sub-sample of recipients with aid>0 in the 
respective sector should reveal a greater need for aid than indicator values for the sub-
                                                           
34  The correlation between per-capita income and specific indicators of need ranges from 0.4 or lower 
(irrigated land, rail lines, prevalence of HIV) to 0.75 or higher (under-5 mortality, births attended 
by skilled health staff, motor vehicles, electrical power consumption, energy use).   19
sample with aid=0. We compare the median of the relevant indicators of need between 
the two sub-samples, using the same indicators as before for total aid of individual 
donors. For each donor and indicator of need, the median for the sub-sample with 
aid>0 is divided by the median for the sub-sample with aid=0. Taking the average of 
the ratios of the target-related indicators for each donor, a ratio above one indicates 
that more needy recipients are concentrated in the sub-sample with aid>0. To avoid 
spurious results, we only include indicators with a minimum of 10 observations in both 
sub-samples. In particular, the comparison of the median is not meaningful when 
almost all recipients receive aid from a donor in the sector under consideration, i.e., for 
donors not being selective in deciding whether or not a recipient gets aid. 
In the second step, we perform rank correlations for the sub-sample with aid>0, in 
order to evaluate whether donors granted more sector-specific aid to more needy 
recipients. Correlations are reported only for donors who granted sector-specific aid to 
at least 20 recipients. As a consequence, there are fewer correlations for donors who 
were highly selective in the first step of the sector-specific allocation process. This 
refers especially to Denmark, which committed aid to less than 20 recipients in various 
sectors, including food aid, basic health, energy and transport. 
Table 5 reveals that both types of food aid were directed primarily to recipient 
countries in which undernourishment and malnutrition of children was more serious. 
Nevertheless, emergency food aid was better targeted than so-called developmental 
food aid. The ratio of the median of indicators of need turns out to be higher in the 
case of emergency food aid for four out of five donors for whom both ratios could be 
calculated (the United States representing the exception). Moreover, the amount of 
emergency aid given by three important donors (Germany, the United States and the 
European Commission) was strongly correlated with the prevalence of 
undernourishment, though not with malnutrition of children. The comparatively weak 
evidence for well-targeted developmental food aid is probably because some donors 
still used this type of “aid” as an outlet of agricultural surplus production at home. This 
would challenge Neumeyer’s (2005) finding that food aid in general appears to be free 
of donor interest. Not surprisingly, the United States and the European Commission 
clearly stand out among the donors under consideration with regard to the number of 
recipients to which developmental food aid had been committed in 2002–2004 (77 and 
59 countries, respectively). 
The results presented in Tables 6 to 8 underscore the previous finding that MDG-
related targets have shaped the allocation of aid to a significantly different degree. The 
evidence for targeted aid is strongest with regard to the fight against HIV through 
committing resources to population programs. The median of HIV prevalence is at 
least four times higher for recipients having received aid in this sector from eight of 
the eleven donors. In addition, the correlations indicate that recipient countries where 
the HIV situation was more serious typically received significantly more financial 
support for population programs.   20
Table 5 — Donor-specific Results for Food Aid: Median and Rank Correlation 
  Developmental food aid  Emergency food aid 
 Median
a Correlation  coefficients
b: Median
a Correlation  coefficients
b: 
  aid>0/aid
=0  undernourishment  malnutrion of 
children 
aid>0/aid
=0  undernourishment  malnutrion of 
children 
Denmark –  –  –  –  –  – 
France 1.42  0.42*  –0.19  2.06  –  – 
Germany 1.81  0.21  –  2.11  0.44**  0.27 
Japan  2.22  –  –0.42 –  –  – 
Netherlands –  –  –  2.06  0.29  –0.29 
Norway –  –  –  2.39  –  – 
Sweden 2.29  –  –  –  –  – 
UK 1.92  –  –  2.43 –  – 
US 2.83  0.03  –0.31*  2.34  0.47**  0.03 
EC 1.63  0.35*  0.10  1.85  0.53**  0.08 
IDA –  –  –  –  –  – 
aMedian for recipient countries with aid>0 divided by median for recipient countries with aid = 0; average for all 
indicators of need ("-" if less than 10 observations).— 
bSpearman rank correlation for all countries with aid > 0 ("-
" if number of observations not exceeding 20); *, ** significant at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex. 
Table  6  —    Donor-specific Results for Aid in Basic Health and Population Programs:   
Median and Rank Correlation 
  Basic health  Population programs
  Median




























Denmark 2.47 –  –  –  –  –  –  6.64  – 
France 2.21  0.46*  0.64** 0.56** 0.39*  0.16  0.52**  8.50  – 
Germany  2.75  0.16  0.08 –0.02  0.23 –0.01 –0.18  4.50  0.36* 
Japan  1.24  0.07 –0.01  0.06 –0.07 –0.01  0.01  1.40  –0.08 
Netherlands  3.58  0.15  –0.09 0.11 0.08  –0.02 0.22 4.67  0.63**
Norway  2.17  0.02 –0.11 –0.05 –0.24 –0.08 –0.10  1.93  0.47**
Sweden  1.17  – –  – – – – 8.50  – 
UK  2.49  0.44*  0.32 0.44*  –0.09 0.46*  0.31 6.17  0.29 
US  1.87  0.14 –0.03  0.07 –0.03 –0.04 –0.01  2.67  0.52**
EC  3.04  –0.02 –0.06  0.05 –0.03 –0.06  0.07  7.00  0.48* 
IDA  – – –  – – – – 4.23  – 
aMedian for recipient countries with aid>0 divided by median for recipient countries with aid = 0; average for 
all indicators of need ("-" if less than 10 observations).— 
bSpearman rank correlation for all countries with aid 
> 0 ("-" if number of observations not exceeding 20); *, ** significant at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex.   21
 
Table 7 —  Donor-specific Results for Aid in Water Supply and Sanitation: 
Median and Rank Correlation 
 Median
a Correlation  coefficients
b: 
  aid>0/aid=0  access to improved water  access to improved 
sanitation 
Denmark 1.13  0.39  0.13 
France 1.03  0.09  0.00 
Germany 1.14  0.08  0.06 
Japan 0.98  0.06  –0.01 
Netherlands 1.10  –0.03  0.00 
Norway 1.20  –0.20  –0.29 
Sweden 1.06  –0.16  –0.03 
UK 1.11  –  – 
US 0.83  –0.23  –0.35 
EC 1.16  –0.40**  –0.38** 
IDA 1.05  –  – 
aMedian for recipient countries with aid>0 divided by median for recipient countries with aid =0; average for all  
indicators of need ("-" if less than 10 observations).— 
bSpearman rank correlation for all countries with aid>0 
("-" if number of observations not exceeding 20); *, ** significant at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex. 
Table 8 — Donor-specific Results for Aid in Basic Education: Median and Rank Correlation 
 Median
a Correlation  coefficients
b: 








Denmark 1.26  – –  0.23  – 
France 1.16  –  0.77**  0.62**  – 
Germany  1.09 0.15  0.05 0.08 0.12 
Japan  1.09 0.22  0.25 0.08 0.16 
Netherlands 1.23  –  –  –0.17  –0.15 
Norway 1.15  0.17  0.23  0.17 0.32 
Sweden  1.09  – – – – 
UK  1.18  – – – – 
US 1.19  –  –  –  –0.14 
EC 1.01  0.15  0.15  –0.11  –0.05 
IDA  – – – – – 
aMedian for recipient countries with aid>0 divided by median for recipient countries with aid =0; average for all  
indicators of need ("-" if less than 10 observations).— 
bSpearman rank correlation for all countries with aid>0 
("-" if number of observations not exceeding 20); *, ** significant at 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex.   22
Basic health conditions other than HIV appear to have received less attention, although 
almost all donors took the health situation of recipients into account when deciding on 
whether or not to commit aid in the basic health sector. Health indicators such as 
mortality rates, the degree of immunization against measles, the incidence of 
tuberculosis and the risk of being infected by malaria are rarely correlated with the 
amount of aid decided upon in the second stage of the aid allocation process.
35 France 
and the United Kingdom are exceptions to this pattern. Measured by the share in total 
aid, the United Kingdom’s aid was most strongly focussed on the health sector (Table 
2 above). Moreover, the United Kingdom devoted 60 percent of its aid in this sector to 
basic health. By contrast, the positive correlations for France may be surprising 
considering that basic health accounted for a minor fraction of (relatively low) French 
aid in the health sector. Arguably, the strong concentration of French aid in Sub-
Saharan Africa, rather than specific health-related targeting, is underlying the results 
for this donor.
36
As concerns the remaining MDG-related targets, the focus of sector-specific aid on the 
most needy recipients turns out to be weaker still. Aid with respect to water supply and 
sanitation has not only declined in relative importance (Table 2). At the same time, 
none of the donors under consideration has clearly favoured recipient countries by 
granting more aid in this sector where the lack of access to safe water and sanitation 
was a more serious problem. The ratio of the median of indicators of need is even 
below one for Japan and the United States, and the highest ratio reported in Table 7 
amounts to just 1.2 (for Norway). Furthermore, all correlations remain completely 
insignificant, except for two negative correlations for EC aid in water supply and 
sanitation.  
Similar to water and sanitation, aid in basic education lacks a clear focus on needy 
recipients. Almost all correlations shown in Table 8 remain insignificant.
37 And for all 
donors the ratio of the median, based on indicators referring to primary schooling and 
gender disparity in education, is just slightly above one. Notably the European 
Commission did not discriminate between more and less needy recipients when 
deciding whether or not to commit aid resources to basic education. Moreover, 
additional findings (not shown) underscore that the allocation of EC aid is particularly 
badly suited to achieve the MDGs related to primary schooling and gender disparity in 
education. The correlation with the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary 
education turns significantly negative if the calculation is based on EC aid in education 
                                                           
35   For Japan and the European Commission, some of the coefficients even turned significantly 
negative when the correlations were run for aid in the health sector, rather than basic health (not 
shown). 
36  More than 60 percent of French aid commitments in 2002-2004 were made in favour of this region. 
This compares with a share of about one third of total aid by all bilateral and multilateral donors. 
37  As for aid in basic health, the exception of France may be attributed to the strong concentration of 
total French aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, rather than specific targeting. The particularly low priority 
of basic education in the sectoral composition of French aid (Table 2 above) also suggests that the 
correlations for France in Table 8 may be spurious.   23
(instead of basic education, which accounted for less than one third of EC aid in 
education). Furthermore, EC aid in education stands out in that it is negatively 
correlated with average years of schooling (though not significantly so). By contrast, 
some bilateral donors (e.g., Denmark, Norway and Sweden), while also lacking a clear 
focus on primary education, have at least directed more aid in education to recipient 
countries where average years of schooling were low. 
Similar to the results for all donors reported above, the sector-specific aid allocation of 
individual donors reveals that more traditional targets continued to receive more 
attention by at least some donors than several MDG-related targets. As concerns aid in 
transport and storage as well as energy generation and supply, which together 
accounted for 75 percent of total aid commitments in infrastructure in 2002–2004, 
donor selectivity was limited to the first step of the aid allocation process (Table 9). 
However, especially when deciding on whether or not to grant aid in transport and 
storage, various donors favoured recipient countries where transport-related indicators 
pointed to greater need for aid. The United States represented a major exception. 
Measured by the ratio of the median of the relevant indicators, US aid was also biased 
against more needy recipients with respect to energy generation and supply. The latter 
finding applied to Japan, too. This suggests that selfish motivations such as promoting 
trade with, and foreign direct investment in relatively advanced developing countries 
were at least partly underlying the allocation of aid in infrastructure by these two 
major donors. As concerns aid in agriculture, all donors except the United States and 
Sweden favoured more needy recipients in the first stage of the allocation process 
(Table 10). In addition, some donors, in particular France and the Netherlands, 
committed more aid to countries where agricultural supply bottlenecks with regard to 
fertilizer use and irrigation were more serious. 
In summary, the sector-specific aid patterns reveal that the allocation of aid leaves 
much to be desired. It is in three respects that sector-specific aid was less targeted than 
one might have expected: First, selectivity in terms of favouring more needy recipients 
was frequently restricted to the first stage of the aid allocation process, whereas the 
correlation between indicators of need and the amount of aid committed to countries 
having passed the first test mostly remained insignificant. Second, and most 
surprisingly, major MDG-related aid targets received little attention by donors. This 
applied especially to basic education as well as water supply and sanitation. Third, the 
targeting of aid differed remarkably between donors. The sector-specific evidence 
supports the view that the allocation of Japanese aid was particularly badly suited to 
help achieve MDG-related targets of aid. Other major donors such as the United States 
and the European Commission provided targeted aid in some respects, but appear to 
have neglected essential MDG-related targets. Aid allocation also differed between the 
supposedly like-minded smaller donors: Dutch and Norwegian aid was better directed 
at MDG-related targets than Swedish and Danish aid.
38
                                                           
38Sweden’s weaker performance may at least partly reflect the country’s strong focus on emergency 
relief and the high share that is classified as multisector aid.   24
Table 9 —  Donor-specific Results for Aid in Infrastructure:  
Median and Rank Correlation 
 Transport  and  storage  Energy generation and supply 
 Median
a Correlation  coefficients
b: Median
a Correlation  coefficients
b: 
 aid>0/aid=0 rail  lines  paved  roads motor 
vehicles  aid>0/aid=0 electr. power 
consumption  energy use 
Denmark  2.41  – – –  1.11  – – 
France  1.30 0.13 0.23 0.18 1.26  –  – 
Germany 2.47  0.11 –0.25 –0.07  1.57 –0.20 –0.07 
Japan  2.34  –0.19  –0.06 0.09 0.97 0.27 0.13 
Netherlands  – – – –  2.21  – – 
Norway  1.26  – – –  1.36  0.05  0.04 
Sweden 1.20  –0.03  –  0.37  1.41  –  – 
UK  2.19  – – –  1.37  – – 
US  0.80  0.06  0.03 –0.12  0.83 –0.28 –0.07 
EC 2.31  0.35*  0.11  0.02  1.07
c –  – 
IDA 2.07  –  – –  2.33  – – 
aMedian for recipient countries with aid>0 divided by median for recipient countries with aid =0; average for all 
indicators of need ("-" if less than 10 observations). — 
bSpearman rank correlation for all countries with aid>0 
("-" if number of observations not exceeding 20); *, ** significant at 5 and 1 percent, respectively.— 
cOnly 
energy use as indicator of need (electr. power consumption less than 10 observations). 
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex. 
Table 10 —  Donor-specific Results for Aid in Agriculture:  
Median and Rank Correlation 
 Median
a Correlation  coefficients
b: 
  aid>0/aid=0  fertilizer consumption  irrigated land 
Denmark 1.37  –  – 
France 3.08  0.28**  0.24* 
Germany 1.91  0.13  0.21 
Japan 1.70  –0.01  –0.09 
Netherlands 2.54  0.38**  0.31* 
Norway 2.67  0.21  0.26 
Sweden 0.96  –  – 
UK 2.45  0.12  0.40* 
US 0.67  0.30*  –0.04 
EC 1.87  –0.10  0.06 
IDA 1.90  –  – 
aMedian for recipient countries with aid>0 divided by median for recipient countries with aid = 0; average for all 
indicators of need ("-" if less than 10 observations).— 
bSpearman rank correlation for all countries with aid > 0 
("-" if number of observations not exceeding 20); *, ** significant at 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations based on sources given in the Annex.   25
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
Our analysis in this paper departs from the observation that the Millennium 
Declaration and the list of MDGs consider growth promotion to be just one channel 
through which aid may help fighting poverty. In the same vein, economists such as 
McGillivray (2003) and Amprou et al. (2005) have called for a broader concept of aid 
selectivity not just including the income and policy situation of recipient countries as 
proposed by Collier and Dollar (2002). And indeed, donors typically claim that their 
aid allocation is based on a multi-dimensional objective function. 
Yet, various developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, will in all 
likelihood miss not only the most prominent MDG of halving absolute poverty by the 
year 2015 but also the more specific targets, e.g., those related to health and education. 
In this paper, we explore one possible reason for this failure, namely that donors may 
have paid insufficient attention to the MDGs by not allocating aid according to the 
MDG-related needs of recipients. Our results do suggest that at least part of the blame 
falls on insufficient targeting of aid. While some MDGs such as the fight against 
HIV/AIDS have shaped the allocation of aid, the sector-specific results reveal that 
with respect to other MDGs, most notably primary education, there is a considerable 
gap between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation. Among donors, Japan stands out 
as a weak performer almost across the board, but even the donors that can be regarded 
as superior have failed to adequately target aid in at least some respects.  
These results invite the conclusion that the current focus on substantially increasing 
aid in order to turn the tide and try to achieve the MDGs misses one important point: 
Unless the targeting of aid is improved, higher aid will not have the desired effects. At 
the same time, it should be stressed that better targeting is just a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for more effective aid. Reinikka and Svensson (2004), for 
example, estimate that over the period 1991-1995, on average, only 13 percent of a 
grant the Ugandan government received to cover primary schools’ non-wage 
expenditures actually reached the schools. Likewise, Easterly (2005) reports for four 
African countries that 30 to 70 percent of government drugs disappeared before 
reaching the patients. Given leakages of such a size, an obvious avenue for future 
research would be to directly estimate how effective the sectoral allocation of aid is in 
achieving the various MDGs. This would include a re-examination of the aid-growth 
relationship estimated by Clemens et al. (2004), employing sectoral aid data rather 
than the aggregate short-impact aid variable that is composed of various aid categories.  
   26
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 ANNEX 
MDGs  Indicators of need (source)a  Relevant aid categoryb (CRS code) 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme    
poverty and hunger    
•  Target 1: Halve the   average per-capita income (World Bank)  total aid 
proportion of people  share of population below $1 a day    
with income of less   human development index (UNDP)
  
than $1 a dayc    
    
•  Target 2: Halve the  prevalence of undernourishment (FAO)  developmental food aid/food security assistance (520) 
proportion of people who  malnutrion of children, weight (World Bank)  emergency food aid (710) 
suffer from hunger    basic nutrition (12240) 
    
Goal 2: Achieve universal     
primary education     
•  Target 3: Ensure  net primary school enrolment ratio (World Bank)  education (110) 
that children complete  primary completion rate, total (World Bank)  basic education (112) 
a full course of  average years of schooling (Barro and Lee)   
primary schooling     
    
Goal 3: Promote gender     
equality and empower women    
•  Target 4: Eliminate gender 
disparity in education 
ratio of girls to boys in prim. & sec. education (World Bank) 
literacy ratio, males to females (World Bank) 
education (110) 
basic education (112) 
   women in development (420) 
    
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality     
•  Target 5: Reduce  under-five mortality rate (World Bank)  health (120) 
under-five mortality rate  immunization, measles (World Bank)  basic health (122) 
    
aAll indicators for 2000 or closest year around 2000. Italics if used only in the analysis of aid by all donors.—bIn addition: total aid for all MDGs/indicators of 
need. Italics if used only in the analysis of aid by all donors combines.—cTarget 1 not specifically considered in this paper; for an analysis of the poverty 
orientation of overall aid, see the literature given in section I. Goal 5: Improve maternal health     
•  Target 6: Reduce the maternal  maternal mortality ratio (UNDP)  health (120) 
mortality ratio  births attended by skilled health staff (World Bank; WHO)  basic health (122) 
    
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS,    
malaria, and other diseases    
•  Target 7: Halt and reverse  prevalence of HIV (World Bank; UNAIDS)  health (120) 
the spread of HIV/AIDS    population programs and reproductive health (130) 
   control of sexually transmitted diseases (13040) 
    
•  Target 8: Halt and reverse  incidence of tuberculosis (WHO)  health (120) 
the incidence of malaria,  malaria ecology (Kiszewski et al.)  basic health (122) 
and other major diseases    infectious disease control (12250) 
    
Goal 7: Ensure environmental     
sustainability    
•  Target 9: Integrate principles  CO2 emissions per capita (World Bank)  general environmental protection (410) 
of sustainable development  forest area (World Bank; FAO)  water resources protection (14015) 
into country policies and  nationally protected areas (UNDP)  waste management/ disposal (14050) 
reverse the loss of environ-  GDP per unit of energy use (World Bank)  agricultural land resources (31130) 
mental resources    
    
•  Target 10: Halve the  access to improved water source (World Bank)  water supply & sanitation (140) 
proportion of people without  access to improved sanitation (World Bank)  basic drinking water supply &basic sanitation 
sustainable access to safe    (14030) 
water and basic sanitation     
    
•  Target 11: Achieve a   same as under target 10  see target 10 
significant improvement    low-cost housing (16040) 
in the lives of slum dwellers    
 Non-MDG related targets  Indicators of need (source)  Aid category (CRS code) 
 
Development of trans-  rail lines (World Bank)  economic infrastructure (200) 
portation system  roads, paved (World Bank)  transport and storage (210) 




Development of   fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (World Bank)  economic infrastructure (200) 
communication systems  internet users (World Bank)  communications (220) 
    personal computers (World Bank) 
 
 
Financial sector  domestic credit to private sector (World Bank)  economic infrastructure (200) 
development  interest rate spread (World Bank)  banking and financial services (240) 
    money and quasi money (M2) (World Bank) 
 
 
Energy sector  electric power consumption per capita (World Bank)  economic infrastructure (200) 
development  energy use per capita (WDI)  energy generation and supply (230) 
 
 
Agricultural development  fertilizer consumption (World Bank)  production sectors (300) 
    land use, irrigated land (World Bank)  agriculture (311) 
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Definition of variables 
 
1.  Aid variables 
•  g-pop  grant equivalent (nominal amount*grant  
  element/100) per population of  
  recipient country 
•  g-total  share of aid in specific sector in total  
  grant equivalent 
2.  Indicators of needa 
•  access to improved water source  percent of population (inverse) 
•  access to improved sanitation  percent of population (inverse) 
•  average years of schooling  relates to the total population aged 15  
  and over (inverse) 
•  births attended by skilled health staff  percent of total (inverse) 
•  CO2 emissions per capita  metric tons per capita 
•  domestic credit to private sector  percent of GDP (inverse) 
•  electric power consumption per capita  kwh per capita (inverse) 
•  energy use per capita  kg of oil equivalent per capita (inverse) 
•  fertilizer consumption  100 gr per hectare of arable land  
  (inverse) 
•  fixed line and mobile phone subscribers  per 1000 people (inverse) 
•  forest area  percent of total land area (inverse) 
•  GDP per unit of energy use  2000 PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent  
  (inverse) 
•  immunization, measles  percent of children of the age of 12-23  
  months (inverse) 
•  incidence of tuberculosis  estimated incidence rate of all forms of  
  tuberculosis, per 100.000 people 
•  interest rate spread  lending minus deposit rate 
•  internet users  per 1000 people (inverse) 
•  land use, irrigated land  percent of crop land (inverse) 
•  literacy ratio, males to females  literacy rate of adult males divided by  
  literacy rate of adult females 
•  malaria ecology  predictive of the extent of malaria  
  transmission 
•  malnutrition of children, weight  percent of children under five 
•  maternal mortality ratio  adjusted ratio per 100.000 live births 
•  money and quasi money (M2)  percent of GDP (inverse) 
•  motor vehicles  per 1000 people (inverse) 
•  nationally protected areas  percent of total land area (inverse) 
•  net primary school enrolment ratio  percent of the population of the  
  corresponding official school age  
  (inverse) 
•  personal computers  per 1000 people (inverse) 
•  prevalence of HIV  percent of population aged 15-49 
•  prevalence of undernourishment  percent of population 
•  primary completion rate, total  percent of the relevant age group  
  (inverse) 
•  rail lines  km per sq km of surface area (inverse) 
•  ratio of girls to boys in primary &   percent (inverse) 
 secundary  education 
•  roads, paved  percent of total roads (inverse) 
•  under-five mortality rate  probability per 1000 newborn babies 
 
a”Inverse” added to definition (in parentheses) if the inverse of the respective variable is 
used to ensure that higher indicator values reflect greater need. 